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11. INTRODUCTION: UNEP, REGIONAL SEAS AND 
CARTAGENA CONVENTION
In June 1972 the UN Conference on the Human Environment, in Stockholm, Sweden 
created the United Nations Environment Programme.  Its task was to oversee all matters 
dealing with the environment addressed by the UN.1  Among its responsibilities and 
successes is the Regional Seas Programme (hereinafter RSP).2  The RSP has 13 
agreements covering over 140 countries.3
The RSP’s mandate, is to coordinate nations bordering on common seas on matters 
related to the prevention of environmental degradation of coastal regions, including 
inland waters, coastal waters and the open sea.4   It operates through a series of periodic 
meetings of high-level officials who develop an Action Plan.5  Simply put, “When the 
same problem crops up in every country, even if only on a local scale, then it becomes a 
common problem.  All the countries of the region benefit by looking for a common 
solution.”6  Essentially RSP tries to coordinate and convert those concerns into regional 
action plans.7
1
 United Nations Environment Programme, “About UNEP” 
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=43&ArticleID=3301 .
2
 For an uptodate review of the entire program including reports from each of the Programmes, see Global 
Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, document 
“Regional Seas: Strategies for Sustainable Development.” http://www.gpa.unep.org/documents/finalrsb.pdf
at Sept 1, 2003. 
3
 RSP, “History of the Regional Seas Programme” (undated) source 
<http://www.unep.ch/seas/main/hhist.html> at June 28, 2003 (hereinafter “History”) no pagination
4
 Ibid.
5
 Ibid.
6
 Editor interview with S. Keckes “Thin ice over Regional Seas,” (1983) 12 Ambio 1, no pagination, 
http://www.unep.ch/seas/Archive/thin.html   at July 15 2003.
7
 Ivica Trumbic, “Regional Seas Programme of UNEP” United Nations Environment Programme—
Mediterranean Action Plan, Priority Actions Programme Regional Activity Centre. 
http://www.unep.ch/seas/Archive/thin.html  at July 12 2003 (hereinafter “Trumbic”) no pagination.
References to section headings, s. 4.
2The two most successful8 of the thirteen conventions are the Barcelona Convention, 
dealing with the Mediterranean Sea and the Cartagena Convention, dealing with the 
Caribbean.9  The later convention was finalized at the RSP meeting in Cartagena de 
Indias, Columbia in 1983.  Although its proper title is, Convention for the Protection and 
Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, it is commonly 
known as the Cartagena Convention (hereinafter “Cartagena”).
8
 Trumbic, s. 4 and s. 6.  Success here appears to mean one or both of: countries cooperating and having a 
significant positive effect on the environment.  As Trumbic notes: “The results and achievements have been 
mixed, and a thorough evaluation of its success still remains to be done.”  Jorge Illueca, current director of 
UNEP Division of Environmental Conventions appears more optimistic.  He wrote: “These regional 
agreements have been extraordinarily effective in engaging governments in protecting the environment.”  
in J.Illueca, “A Regional Seas renaissance.”  (1999) 1 Synergies 2 
http://www.unep.ch/conventions/synergies/synergiesmag.htm   at July 12, 2003.  Von Moltke observes: 
“The Regional Seas Programme has put in place a series of agreements to protect marine resources.  None 
of these agreements has been effective in the sense that the trend of increasing pollution of the marine 
environment… has been reversed.” K. von Moltke, “Why UNEP Matters” Green Globe Yearbook (1996) p. 
58.  Interestingly, legal scholar E. Brown Weiss notes the near total lack of investigation on the efficacy of 
international legal agreements in terms of implementation and compliance. “Symposium: International 
Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order” (March 1993) 81 
Geo. LJ 695-697.
9
 Trumbic, s. 4.
3(Source: Global Marine Oil Pollution Gateway website)
2.  CARTAGENA CONVENTION: AN ANALYSIS
Cartagena along with its three protocols, dealing with oil spills,10 protected areas,11 and 
land based pollution,12 respectively, is one of the most comprehensive RSPs. In addition 
as of  February 2, 2002  Cartagena was also coordinated with the Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission for the Caribbean of UNESCO  by way of a Memorandum 
of Cooperation.13  Cartagena is not a stand alone agreement or designed to supersede 
extent agreements. Partly it is designed  to supplement other multilateral treaties in place 
such as MARPOL 73/78 and the Convention on Biological Diversity and to complement 
UNCLOS.
Cartagena is made up of thirty articles dealing with general objectives and responsibilities 
and a separate Annex of ten articles dealing with dispute resolution.  The preamble 
indicates the parties’ recognition of their responsibilities for the region’s important and 
valuable marine environment, and their need to coordinate their efforts in order to 
preserve the environment in the development process.  The parties specifically identify 
the need to secure wider acceptance of environmental agreements already in place and 
note that there are gaps in those agreements that need to be addressed. Cartagena is 
10
 A Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Oil Spills (CEPPOL) in the Wider Caribbean Region, 
March 24, 1983. entered into force simultaneously with the Convention on 11 October 1986 
http://www.cep.unep.org/law/cartstatus.html  at July 2, 2003.
11
 A Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) in the Wider Caribbean Region  
January 18, 2000 entered into force on June 18, 2000. http://www.cep.unep.org/law/cartstatus.html  at July 
2, 2003. 
12
 A Protocol on Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities (LBSMP) October 6, 1999 in 
Aruba. Has not yet entered into force http://www.cep.unep.org/law/cartstatus.html  at July 2, 2003.
13
 An Overview of Cartagena Convention, http://www.unep.ch/seas/main/hoverv.html   at July 2, 2003.      .
4focused on those waters making up the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and extends to 
the limits of the EEZ of the parties.
Article 1 identifies the area to be addressed—“the wider Caribbean region” (hereinafter 
WCR)—and notes that the area does not include internal waters of the countries.  Article 
2 deals with definitions.  It identifies the WCR as including the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Caribbean Sea, and those adjacent areas of the Atlantic Ocean, south of 30 degrees 
latitude north and within 200 nautical miles of the Atlantic coasts of signatories to 
Cartagena.
Article 3, entitled “General Provisions”, sets out the terms governing relationships 
between Cartagena and other obligations taken on by the parties.  Specifically, it notes 
that Cartagena shall not be deemed to modify any of those obligations, nor prejudice 
claims concerning matters of maritime jurisdiction.  It anticipates and encourages further 
conventions to protect the environment. 
Article 4 sets out the general obligations pursuant to Cartagena of the signatories.  They 
are to:
individually or jointly, take all appropriate measures in conformity with 
international law… to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the Convention 
area… to ensure sound environmental management, using… best practicable 
means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities.
5In fulfilling these objectives, they are not to damage the marine environment outside of 
the WCR.  The parties are obligated to cooperate in implementing Cartagena and in 
assisting one another in the fulfillment of their duties. 
Cartagena then addresses more specific issues.  Article 5 requires the parties to: 
take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
Convention area caused by discharges from ships, and for this purpose, to ensure 
the effective implementation of the applicable international rules and standards 
established by the competent international organization.
 Articles 6, 7, 8, and 9 reiterate the language of Article 5 with respect to dumping, land-
based sources of marine pollution, sea-bed activities, and airborne pollution respectively.  
Article 10, which deals with specially protected areas, is forward looking both in 
anticipating further conventions or protocols to establish protected areas, and in its 
precautionary principle14 and “ecosystem” approach.15  It requires “all appropriate 
measures to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems, as well as the habitat of 
depleted, threatened or endangered species.”
Article 11 sets out some specific duties.  In the event of an emergency, all parties 
requested are required to respond to the emergency, regardless of cause.  It requires the 
parties individually and jointly to prepare “contingency plans.” Further, it requires the 
parties to notify other states likely to be affected by pollution whenever the notifying 
party becomes aware of either pollution or a threat of pollution.  Finally, it requires 
parties to inform each other and appropriate international bodies of remedial action taken.
14
 Weiss Brown, above n 7, 690.
6Article 12 requires parties to develop technical standards and the corollary legislation to 
protect the environment in “major development projects.”  It requires the parties to a  
major development to consult with RSP and through it, with other parties affected by the 
major development.  This cooperation requirement is interesting in that the development 
could be on land, and could be seen by some parties as an infringement of sovereignty.  
Article 13 extends the cooperation, in non-mandatory language, to sharing scientific 
information relating to Cartagena and the WCR.  It also calls for coordinating joint 
research projects and the linking of research centers, and in mandatory language, for 
participating in international arrangements for research and monitoring. Article 14 
requires the parties to cooperate in the development of law to address liability and 
compensation in the event of pollution damage.
Article 15 deals with the development of institutions to administer Cartagena while 
designating UNEP as the secretariat for Cartagena.   Article 16 sets out a scheme of bi-
annual meetings with contingency meetings to be called as necessary, and what is to be 
addressed at those meetings. 
Article 17 addresses additional protocols, and Article 18 deals with Amendments to 
Cartagena and its protocols.  It is an open procedure permitting any party to propose 
amendments and sets out the procedure in general terms. Annexes and their amendments 
are dealt with in Article 19, the terms of which are essentially the same as those for 
Amendments to Cartagena and protocols set out in the previous article.  Article 20 
15
 Ibid, 690.
7addresses further procedural matters and sets out the parties’ responsibility to identify 
their individual, specific financial responsibilities under Cartagena.
Article 21 permits other regional economic bodies to vote on behalf of all parties where 
those parties do not vote, in specific areas of competence.  Article 22 provides the 
specifics of how and when the information required to be transferred pursuant to 
Cartagena be done—at the times and in the manner as the parties determine.  Essentially, 
it draws attention to the need to formalize the information transfer.
Article 23 deals with dispute settlement concerning issues of interpretation of Cartagena.  
It specifically and repeatedly requires the parties to use “peaceful means” to resolve 
disputes, and permits any party unilaterally to submit the dispute for arbitration (pursuant 
to the terms of the Arbitration Annex to Cartagena).
Article 24 prohibits parties from becoming signatories to Cartagena unless they too 
become signatories to the Protocol.  This provision seems to address the weakness of 
previous international agreements, which while committing parties to the agreement, fail 
to place immediate, positive duties to act.16
Articles 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 deal with the technical mechanisms of signatures, 
ratification, accession, entry into force, denunciation, and depository respectively.   
Cartagena was opened for signature on March 21, 1983 in Cartagena de Indias, 
8Columbia.  The Columbian government is the depository.  It permits non-signatories to 
become parties to Cartagena on approval of at least three-fourths of the parties.  It further
permits non-state parties to be members, and in particular, regional economic 
organizations to become members provided they meet certain conditions.  Cartagena and 
the Protocol on Oil Spills was to come into force thirty days after the ninth instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval had been deposited.  This criterion for coming into 
force is to apply to all subsequent protocols.  Denunciation is permitted only after a 
period of two years of coming into force to be effective ninety days after the 
denunciation.  Denunciation of Cartagena is deemed to extend to the protocols as well, 
and denunciation of a protocol is deemed denunciation of Cartagena.
In summary, the main duties created by Cartagena with respect to pollution are: pollution 
from ships (Art. 5), dumping (Art. 6), land-based pollution of the marine environment 
(Art. 7), sea-bed exploitation (Art. 8), and air-borne pollution (Art. 9).  In addition, it 
creates obligations concerning the development of specially protected areas (Art. 10), the 
development of contingency plans (Art. 11), the development of technical standards and a 
consultative process for major developments (Art. 12), sharing of scientific information 
(Art. 13), development of appropriate laws and the coordination of law (Art. 14), and 
institutional development (Art. 15). 
16
 Weiss Brown notes all the Regional Seas Agreements have included this feature as a lesson from 
previous international agreements.  The failure of the efficacy of previous agreements is attributable, in 
part, to the failure to include such provisions.  Above n 7, 688.
93.  COMPARISON WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS AND REGIONAL SEAS AGREEMENTS
As one of a number of international agreements dealing with this issue, it is worth 
considering how Cartagena stands in comparison with these other agreements, both from 
an analytical perspective, and from a practical perspective. The value of such a 
comparison is that it provides an external hermeneutical tool for understanding 
Cartagena.  In particular, many of the signatories to Cartagena, 17 are also signatories to 
such international agreements as MARPOL 73/78 and UNCLOS.18  In this section, 
attention will be turned to examine the interaction between Cartagena and MARPOL 
73/78. 
MARPOL 73/78 
17
 As noted by various scholars, the USA has followed its own scheme making coordination with 
international frameworks difficult. See for example, comments on the Oil Pollution Act, 1990 and 
comments by M. White , “Development of the International Conventions” sec. 3.3.6, Ch. 3 in Marine 
Pollution Laws of the Australian Region, (1994).  In addition, its environmental law system tends to be 
inward focused.  USA monitors and regulates its own activities affecting the Gulf of Mexico, as is evident 
from the EPA’s website on the area, <http://www.epa.gov/region6/water/ecopro/index.htm>  at June 28 
2003, and appears to have little cooperation with international agencies such as CEP.  Its National Ocean 
Service notes various international projects, but none are focused on pollution in the Gulf of Mexico 
generally. For that reason, the following analysis will not deal with the USA.  The National Environmental 
Protection Act mandates cooperation on an international level where it furthers US interests. Title 42,
Chap. 55  Sec. 4332.
18
 The 1982 UN Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets as its objective to create: “a legal order for the seas and 
oceans which will facilitate… equitable and efficient utilization… [and] the conservation of their living 
resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment.” (preamble)  UNCLOS 
was a significant step in a different direction with respect to environmental law pertaining the global 
commons for the world.  In particular, UNCLOS precludes the view of the oceans and seas as an open 
dumping grounds for anyone choosing to do so.  Further, it shifted the balance between the competing 
navigational interests of flag states and the environmental interests of coastal states.   Finally, it took a 
proactive approach to the prevention of marine environmental pollution instead of an after the fact 
apportionment of liability approach. P.W. Birnie and A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 
2nd ed (2002).  (in course materials page numbers cut off.) UNCLOS does not, however, set out specifics of 
how these obligations are to be fulfilled, administered or enforced.  Those aspects are left to the parties as 
they negotiate various conventions, protocols and other instruments to address those specific concerns. 
Therefore an analysis of UNCLOS is not particularly relevant and a review of the specific instruments, 
Cartagena and MARPOL 73/78 is appropriate.
10
MARPOL 73/78 was initially negotiated in London in 1973 as a successor to OILPOL.  
Due to problems with non-ratification of MARPOL 73, it was revised by a second 
meeting in London in 1978—MARPOL 78—in which sufficient modifications were 
negotiated to obtain the required ratifications needed to come into force.19  MARPOL 73 
consists of its preamble and twenty articles and one convention. The preamble 
acknowledges the importance of the environment for human survival and the negative 
impact of oil on the environment.  It sets out the interesting lofty objective of “Desiring 
to achieve the complete elimination of intentional pollution of the marine environment by 
oil and other harmful substances and the minimization of accidental discharge of such 
substances.”20  The parties state their belief that this objective can best be achieved by 
rules addressing all pollution and not just oil.
MARPOL works on the basis of certifying ships in terms of safety, and pollution 
compliance.  It further grants inspection powers, detainment and prosecution powers to 
both flag states, port states and coastal states. Article one sets out the parties’ 
commitment to be bound by the agreement, its protocol and annexes. Article two, which 
offers definitions is important for its definitions of substances, discharges and ships.  Its 
broad definitions of “harmful substance,” which includes anything that harms marine life 
or damage to amenities, and “discharge”, which is defined as “any release howsoever 
caused… and includes any escape, disposal, spilling, leaking, pumping, emitting or 
emptying” are considerably limited by exclusions under 3(b)(i) of dumping under the 
19
 IMO website, conventions, MARPOL 73/78 <http://www.imo.org/home.asp> at July 3 2003.
20
 MARPOL 73/78 preamble.
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dumping convention, and (ii) of sea-bed mineral resource exploitation.21  “Ships” include 
any type of human made thing for use on, in or underwater, fixed or free.  There is no 
limit to the size of the thing that MARPOL 73 is to apply.  
Article three states MARPOL 73 is to apply to all vessels flying the flag of a party or 
operating under the authority of a party.  It specifies that MARPOL 73 is not designed to
derogate from sovereign rights for exploration or exploitation of resources, and excludes 
all state ships in non-commercial governmental service. 
Article four deals states that violations may be dealt with either under the law of the 
offended Party to MARPOL 73, or may be brought by the Administration of the ship.  
Article five begins with MARPOL 73’s certificates regime.  It requires all ships under the 
administration of a Party to have a certificate declaring the state of the ship.  Parties are 
permitted to inspect ships for the purpose of determining whether the certificate is 
aboard, and in the event that there is considerable discrepancy between the certificate and 
the condition of the vessel, Parties are permitted to detain vessels until repaired, or 
authorize their departure only to sail to the nearest appropriate repair yard.  MARPOL 73 
also permits a party to deny entry to a vessel of another signatory for such breaches; 
however, in such instances diplomatic notification must be given immediately.
Article six sets out the responsibilities of cooperation among the parties.  They are to be 
using “all appropriate measures of detection and environmental monitoring, adequate 
21
 3(b)(iii) also excludes discharges for scientific purposes, which do not appear to be significant as they do 
not appear to be used as a pretext for dumping.
12
procedures for reporting and accumulation of evidence.”  It furthers the inspection rights 
of parties to inspection for purposes determining whether ships have discharged in 
violation.  In the event of such a discharge, the investigating party is required to forward 
the evidence to the administrator which in turn is obligated to take proceedings, provided 
the evidence is sufficient.  It further permits one party to investigate a ship on the request 
of a second party.  
Article seven addresses the reasonable commercial concern that ships shall not be 
“unduly detained or delayed” and that in the event of such detention or delay, 
compensation shall be paid “for any loss or damage suffered.”  Article eight addresses the 
need for communicating information by mandating that the parties set up an office or 
agency to deal with matters of MARPOL 73 and inform the IMO and other parties about 
the office or agency. 
Article nine deals with the interaction of MARPOL 73 with other conventions and 
specifically that it does not affect legal positions parties may take under UNCLOS, nor 
jurisdictional rights of coastal or flag states pursuant to international law.  Article ten 
addresses dispute settlement by requiring parties to submit such disputes to arbitration 
pursuant to Protocol II to MARPOL 73. Article eleven requires the parties to 
communicate legislation dealing with MARPOL, NGO’s dealing with MARPOL 73 
related matters, and samples of certificates, a list and details of reception facilities, 
reports which provide evidence of the application of MARPOL 73, and annual statistical 
reports to the IMO.
13
Article twelve requires parties to investigate casualties to ships where the casualty has 
resulted in a “major deleterious effect upon the marine environment” and to report it to 
the IMO.  Article thirteen deals with the signatory and ratification process.  Article 
fourteen addresses the annexes.  Annexes I and II dealing with oil and noxious liquid 
substances were mandatory at the time of signing.  The additional annexes, III, IV, and V 
dealing respectively with harmful packaged substances, sewage and garbage, are 
optional.
Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 deal with entry into force provisions, amending 
procedures, technical cooperation, denunciation confirming the IMO as the depository 
and finally, and languages and official translations, respectively. MARPOL 78 Article 
one delays the coming into force of Annex II for three years. The second article restricts 
and places identification responsibilities for the NGO’s involved. These are the two 
substantive changes MARPOL 78 adds to MARPOL 73.
4.  ANALYTICAL COMPARISON
Cartagena and MARPOL, while ostensibly dealing with the same matter, marine 
environmental pollution, are very different treaties.  Aside from the obvious difference in 
scope as between a regional and an international agreement, and the focus of a general 
environmental treaty versus a treaty focused on ship source pollution, the treaties differ 
substantially with respect to their design, structure, implementation frameworks and 
14
objectives.  Those particular differences and consequential efficacy will be examined in 
this section.
Cartagena is a very broadly drafted treaty, reflecting an effort to include as many actual 
and potential environmental concerns as possible.  This approach permits the details to be 
negotiated separately in protocols and annexes.  Doing so allows the parties to get a basic 
framework into place more easily and start on the process of moving toward the objective 
with less obstacles. 
By way of contrast, MARPOL is very specific.  Whereas Cartagena offers the general
obligation of “all appropriate measures,… to prevent, reduce and control pollution”, 
MARPOL 73/78 in its definitions identifies the issues to be addressed—“discharges” of 
“harmful substances.”22  Further, MARPOL grants more specific rights directly to parties 
in terms of inspections and enforcement than does Cartagena.  Of course, Cartagena goes 
well beyond ships and so clearly such rights which could over-ride sovereignty claims 
could not be granted easily.
In terms of structure, in addition to the specifics noted in the detailed analysis above it 
can be noted that the overall structure of  MARPOL 73/78 is focused on ocean activities. 
By way of contrast, Cartagena is structured with a focus on member rights and 
obligations. MARPOL 73/78  is deposited and monitored by a strong, well recognized, 
international body, the IMO.  Cartagena is administered by a relatively young, smaller, 
poorly funded local office of UNEP located in Kingston, Jamaica.
15
Specifically focusing on Cartagena’s ship source marine pollution provisions, it may be 
characterized as exceedingly general.  Again, the language is 
shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
Convention area caused by discharges from ships and, for this purpose, to ensure 
the effective implementation to the applicable international rules and standards 
established by the competent international organization.23
There are at least three ways to interpret this Article.  It could be read as referring to 
parties’ obligation to ensure compliance with international agreements concerning ship-
sourced pollution.  Or, it could be read as indicating an obligation to create agreements 
concerning ship-based pollution which are in conformity with international law, or it 
could be read as reaffirming an obligation for the parties themselves to comply with 
obligations placed on them by international law.
By way of contrast, MARPOL 73/78 includes in its Protocol a series of specific 
regulations detailing not only the size and types of ships it applies to, but also the 
permitted amounts of discharges and the specific duties placed on parties and mariners 
and others in the event of discharges. One result of such specificity is that MARPOL 
´73/78´s  successes and failures are more easily measured.
Although in one sense, it may not be fair, let alone feasible to make a comparison 
between the agreements, given their different focuses and scopes; in the areas in which 
22 See Appendix B.
23
 Art. 5
16
they overlap, there is some, if not sufficient, basis for comparison.  This comparison 
should provide not only some idea of the efficacy of various approaches, but also the 
efficacy of international instruments of environmental law, at least in the Caribbean 
region. 
5.  “ON THE GROUND” RESULTS ANALYSIS
5.1  MARPOL: SUCCESS?
MARPOL 73/78 is generally considered a great success.  The oil industry points to the 
reduced tanker discharges.  Indeed, there has been success in terms of reducing oil tanker 
disasters.  As observed by INTERTANKO, the oil tanker owners group, “The average 
number of large spills per year during the 1990s was about a third of that witnessed 
during the 1970’s.”24  These figures, though comforting they may be, leave room for 
question on MARPOL success in other areas.
In Gerard Peet´s effort to evaluate the success or failure of MARPOL 73/78 he observes 
that there are two criteria in determining success—a reduction of the total amount of oil 
entering the marine environment from accident or operation of ships, and second, 
determining whether national governments have effectively implemented international 
agreements.25   The basis for answering the first question is monitoring statistics.  As Peet 
observes, however, “[there are] only a few areas in the world where adequate efforts are 
24
 ITOPF, “Historical Data”  Statistics, at p. 2, http://www.itopf.com/stats.html, at July 5, 2003.
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made to detect… discharges.”26 Its lack of monitoring state compliance and its lack of 
mechanism for dealing with non-complying states.27
He notes, for example, that according to GESAMP statistics, the North Sea appears to 
have a very high level of discharges, but then notes than extensive Dutch efforts to 
monitor oil in the North Sea.28  By way of contrast, from the reported statistics, one 
would believe there is hardly any oil being discharged into the seas south of the equator.  
He offers: “It is more likely that the numbers of detected discharges are an indication of 
the effort made to detect discharges”29  than a reflection of actual discharges. Peet finds 
that within a single publication, GESAMP’s  1993 report, that two significantly different 
estimates of oil entering the marine environment are offered.  The one estimate is 2.3 
million tons, the other is 7.3 million tons.  From this he concludes “The various estimates 
are too far apart…. The only valid conclusion seems to be that we do not really know 
how much oil enters the marine environment, due to a lack of reliable data.”30
 A failure to declare MARPOL 73/78 a success in reducing oil entering into the marine 
environment, however, is not a declaration that it has failed to have a positive impact in 
reducing ship based discharges. 
The second measurable determinant of MARPOL 73/78 success, national compliance 
with international obligations, does not seem to fare much better.  To arrive at this 
25
 G. Peet “International Co-operation to Prevent Oil Spills at Sea: Not Quite the Success It should Be.” In 
H. Ole and G. Parmann (eds) Green Globe Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and 
Development (1994) p 41-54.
26 Ibid. p. 44.
27
 Birnie above n. 14.
28
 Ibid, p. 44.
29
 Ibid.
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conclusion, Peet examines ratifying countries’ compliance with MARPOL 73/78’s 
clauses requiring measurable action.  These are: Art. 11(e) and (f) the reporting 
requirements, Art 6(1) use of all appropriate measures to detect, Art 4(1), (2), (3), and (4) 
mandatory enforcement measures, and Annex I, Reg. 12(1) concerning port reception 
facilities. We will turn briefly to analyze country compliance with  the obligations 
contained in each of these articles.
With respect to Art.11´s reporting requirements, Peet observes that only the Australians 
have submitted every annual report as required by the convention, and that another seven 
have submitted all but one.   He goes on to note, however, that thirty countries party to 
MARPOL 73/78 have never submitted a single report.31  It is hard to imagine, says Peet, 
how a country that fails such a relatively simple administrative task is directing attention 
to the more difficult task of fulfilling other obligations under the convention.32
Article 6(1) deals with detection and monitoring duties. In the previously mentioned 
study, when The Netherlands devoted additional resources to detection, significantly 
more discharges were detected creating an impression that the North Sea was exception 
in the amount of oil and waste being discharged into the ocean.  Given these obviusly 
skewed discharge statistics, showing high levels when monitoring detection measures are 
being implemented it can hardly be argued that countries are fulfilling their MARPOL 
73/78 obligations.33
30
 Ibid, 43.
31 Ibid.
32
 Ibid, 47.
33
 Ibid, 48.
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As to the efficacy of the prosecutions mandated pursuant to Article 4, the situation is 
even more dismal.  After his examination and analysis of detection, detentions and 
prosecutions, Peet concludes in agreement with the conclusion of another study by the 
Werkgroep Noordzee:34
There was little chance that ships would be detected… [and if detected] little 
chance that they would be brought to justice… [and if convicted] chances were 
small penalties would be given… [and if given would] definitely not [be] 
adequate in severity to discourage MARPOL 73/78 violations.35
Finally, as to the obligation to provide port reception facilities created by Annex I, Reg. 
12, there seems to be a very low level of compliance.  A 1986 study found the lack of 
port reception facilities to be a serious complaint by shipmasters hampering their ability 
to comply with MARPOL 73/78 requirements36 and as noted in their 2002 work, Birnie 
and Boyle write: “the persistence of operational discharges does indicate a continuing 
inadequacy in the provision of port reception facilities, a long-standing problem despite 
the obligation to provide them placed on port states by the MARPOL Convention.”37
Turning our focus back to the WCR sheds further light on MARPOL 73/78´s success. 
MARPOL 73/78 in the WCR does not seem to have reached even a basic level of 
success.  In his 1996 study of the state of marine law in the Caribbean region, Prof. 
Anderson observes, that a strict application of even MARPOL 73/78’s predecessor, 
34
 (Trans. “North Sea Workgroup”)  M. J.  Stoop Olieverontreiniging door schepen op de Noordzee over de 
periode 1982-1987, opsporing en vervoging, cited in Peet, above n 21, 54, n 10.  In other words, from a 
shipmaster’s perspective there appears to be minimal legal incentive to comply with MARPOL 73/78.  
Such compliance would be more as a result of the shipmaster’s own convictions on matters concerning the 
marine environment than legal duties. 
35 Above n 21, 50.
36
 Ibid 50-51.
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OILPOL, would reduce oil annual discharges from 1,000,000 tons to 16,700 tons.38
Unfortunately, it is simply not being done.
Although pursuant to MARPOL 73/78, the Caribbean was declared an Annex V 
(protection from pollution from garbage) special area, the important Annex I (protection 
from oil pollution) Special Area designation has not been put into place.  The issue is the 
previously mentioned costly reception facilities.39  This state of affairs—the failure to 
protect from garbage and oil pollution-- is particularly lamentable given on the one hand, 
the region’s great biological diversity, beauty and the important economic boost from the  
tourism industry dependent on that beauty, and on the other hand, the region’s significant 
oil reserves, production and transportation.
Perhaps the only correct conclusion is that of Birnie and Boyle who observed: 
“Quantifying MARPOL’s impact is… not straightforward, and the data do not point to 
any clear conclusion, except that the operational pollution does appear to have 
declined.”40
5.2  CARTAGENA CONVENTION: SUCCESS?
Cartagena’s objectives vis-à-vis pollution are the control and reduction of: pollution from 
ships (Art. 5), dumping (Art. 6), land-based pollution of the marine environment (Art. 7), 
pollution from sea-bed exploitation (Art. 8), and air-borne pollution (Art. 9).  In addition, 
37
 Ibid.
38
 W. Anderson, The Law of Caribbean Marine Pollution, (1996) 67, n. 104.
39
 Ibid, 138.
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it creates obligations concerning the development of specially protected areas (Art. 10), 
the development of contingency plans (Art. 11), the development of technical standards 
and a consultative process for major developments (Art. 12), sharing of scientific 
information (Art. 13), development of appropriate laws and the coordination of law (Art. 
14), and institutional development (Art. 15). 
We will analyse these Cartagena goals making reference as well to the three protocols.  
Article 5, dealing with pollution from ships is complementary to MARPOL 73/78 and 
relates to discharges of harmful substances.  Ships release harmful substances by 
operation and by accident.  In terms of pollution from operation, they produce harmful 
substances in the course of making their journeys.  These harmful substances are waste 
oil, air pollution, and garbage and sewage.41  To avoid the discharge of these harmful 
substances at sea, they must discharge them at ports in port reception facilities.  The issue 
then becomes one of port reception facilities.42
Port reception facilities in the WCR are either non-existent or inadequate at best.  An 
IMO/World Bank study found that of 23 site visits to port reception facilities in the 
WCR, 10 ports did not permit off-loading of solid wastes and that the13 that permitted 
off-loading did not have sufficient facilities to deal with the waste.43  This lack of port 
40
 Ibid.
41
 Birnie above n 14.
42
 This is after one considers such issues as the master’s desire not to pollute and surveillance and 
enforcement measures as previously discussed.
43
 Environmental Resources Limited,  “Port Reception and Disposal Facilities from Garbage in the Wider 
Caribbean.” (1991). IMO/World Bank, 287. cited in “Oil and Litter” Global Plan of Action for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities 
http://www.cep.unep.org/gpa/oilitter.htm , at July 5, 2003. 
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reception facilities is noted as a cause of oil pollution in the WCR.44  Further, cruise ships 
which generate about 4,400 kg of waste per day,45 place an additional demand for port 
reception facilities and are known to dump untreated sewage and hazardous waste 
directly into the marine environment of the WCR.46 In addition to increased cruise ship 
activity, the Caribbean in increasingly becoming an important area for containerized 
shipping.47  This development places further demands the environment from shipping 
activities, particularly in light of the inadequate port reception facilities.48
Comprehensive spill statistics for non-tankers are non-existent in the WCR.   There is a 
serious lack of information about oil contamination by ships in the WCR.49  Given the 
lack of monitoring,50 one may conclude that oil discharges by ships are not being tracked, 
addressed or discouraged through legal proceedings and accordingly, it is a foregone 
44
 Caribbean Environment Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, CEP Technical Report 
No. 33 “Regional Overview of Land-Based Sources of Pollution in the Wider Caribbean Region” (1994)  
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/techreports/tr33en/index.html  at July 12 2003.
45
 GESAMP “A Sea of Troubles,” Reports and Studies No. 70 at p. 28,  
http://gesamp.imo.org/no70/index.htm  at July 15, 2003.
46
 Ibid,  p. 24.  GESAMP notes that about one third of the wasted dumped by cruise ships in the Caribbean 
is done deliberately.  In the recent past, Norwegian Cruise Lines, Carnival Corp. and Royal Caribbean 
Cruises all have faced fines ranging from $1 million to $27 million for illegal pollution of the marine 
environment.  Further these companies have engaged in production of fraudulent documents to cover up 
their wrong-doing. In November, 2002 Norwegian was given the smallest fine of $1 million because of its 
efforts to report, cooperate and change its operating procedures.   M. Adams, “U.S. Keeps Wary Eye On 
Cruise Ships For More Pollution” Miami USA TODAY 11 August 2002.  
<http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2002/2002-11-08-cruise-dumping.htm> at July 15, 2003.  The 
court’s decision, however, to accept Norwegian’s position seems somewhat suspect when one considers 
Norwegian’s May 2003 action. As the Seattle Times reported: “The 2,400-passenger Norwegian Cruise 
Line ship… dumped more than 16,000 gallons of human waste in the Strait of Juan de Fuca last weekend.” 
C. Welch, “Dumping of ship's waste widens rift between state, Coast Guard” (Seattle) Seattle Times 8 May 
2003  http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134699148_ship08m.html  at 15 July 2003.  
Holland America has also received a multi-million dollar fine for sewage discharge.  Noted on Navy 
Shipyard Clearinghouse website <http://navyseic.dt.navy.mil/oil/oil.htm> 15 July 2003. 
47
 See for example, CSX’s new port facility being built in the Dominican Republic, noted below n 68.
48
 CEP Technical Report No. 33 above n 39, 7. 
49
 GESAMP Statement 2001 http://gesamp.imo.org/  at 10 July 2003.
50
 The Government of Mexico claims to be monitoring the situation, however, any details of such programs 
are not available.  III Estudios y Actividades, sec. D The marine environmental program is run by the 
Mexican navy. http://www.semar.gob.mx/promam.htm  at 21 July 2003.
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conclusion that they occur with relative frequency.  Such being the case, the 
determination of the actual amount of pollution entering the WCR marine environment as 
a result of shipping activities is impossible.  Accordingly, it is not possible to make any 
statements, positive or negative, about the utility of Art.6 of the Cartagena in decreasing 
pollution by ships in the Caribbean. One can merely speculate that with the explosion in 
shipping and cruise ships in the WCR that the environmental situation is not improving.
Article 7, deals with land-based sources of pollution.   A determination of Cartagena’s 
utility in reducing land-based pollution can be done by an examination of two sources:  
the technical reports concerning contaminants entering the Caribbean, and by reference to
a particular visible land-based use which places heavy demands on the marine 
environment—tourism.51
Land-based marine environmental pollution in the WCR has six main sources:  sewage, 
oil hydrocarbons, sediments, nutrients, pesticides, solid waste and marine debris, and toxic 
substances.52 The two leading land-based pollutants of the marine environment—sewage 
and oil—will be briefly examined. 
By 1993, sewage had been identified as by far the most significant pollutant.53 As noted 
in the RSP report, “From the Regional overview, we conclude that the main problems 
51
 A legal review of duties under the protocol on land-based contaminants will not assist as it is not yet in 
force.
52 CEP Technical Report 33 above n 39. While sediments, nutrients, pesticides, solid wastes and toxic 
materials are also significant pollutants in the WCR, space precludes their discussion.
53 Ibid 5.
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affecting the Caribbean Sea are domestic sewage and solid waste.”54 The WCR sewage 
problem is caused by the large number of people living along the coast, tourism, industry 
and ship wastes.  Unfortunately, little information concerning sewage treatment along the 
non-USA coasts has been available.55  A survey of sewage treatment plants in the WCR 
led to the conclusion that there are inadequate numbers of such plants and that 
approximately two thirds of those in operation were inadequaly maintained to serve their 
function.56  It has been estimated that no more than ten percent of the population in the 
WCR is served by sewage treatment.57  Despite knowledge of the problem in the 1980s  
the situation appears no different in 2003.58
The WCR is one of the world’s leading oil producing regions.59  As a result, there are 
considerable associated activities, including, exploring, drilling, extracting, refining and 
transport that take place on land.  These activities lead to spillage of oil and hydrocarbons 
into natural and human-made systems that empty into the marine environment.  Oil 
refineries and petrochemical plants in the WCR have been identified as a major source of 
marine pollution60 and the oil industry as the largest industrial polluter.61   Further, the 
54UNEP: Assessment of Land-based Sources and Activities Affecting the Marine, Coastal and Associated 
Freshwater Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region,” UNEP/GPA Co-ordination Office & Caribbean 
Environment Programme (1999) 20 (hereinafter UNEP Assessment) 
www.gpa.unep.org/documents/technical/ rseas_reports/169-eng.pdf at 10 July 2003.
55
 CEP Technical Report 33 above n 39, 8 notes the “intense traffic of coastal cargo vessels and recreational 
boats in the WCR” and that they lack facilities to process their own wastes.
56
 Ibid 5.
57 KCM, Inc, CEP Technical Report 40, “Appropriate Technology for Sewage Pollution Control in the 
Wider Caribbean Region,” (1998) 7. http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/techreports/tr40en/index.html  at 8 July 
2003. 
58
 UNEP GEO- 3 (Global Environmental Outlook) (2002)  18.  http://www-cger.nies.go.jp/geo/geo3/  at 18 
July 2003. 
59
 CEP Technical Report. 33 above n 39, 9 notes that the WCR provides approximately, 170 x 10 6 tons of 
oil per year.
60
 Ibid, 10.
61
 UNEP GEO – 1 (1997),  Box 2.3.
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risk of spills and pollution is high.62 Despite this recognition, little has been done to 
determine the risks or prepare a response.63  Even basic monitoring responsibilities, 
created under Cartagena´s oil spill protocol of 1983, are not being fulfilled.64
Article 8 of Cartagena deals with sea-bed exploitation.  It can be assessed by examining 
how the WCR has dealt with its main sea-bed resource, oil.  As observed above, WCR 
seems to have had little success in dealing with its oil pollution problems whether caused 
by the industry itself or by ship related activities.
Article 10 requires the parties to create specially protected areas.  CEP’s SPAW 
programme has made some progress in terms of establishing Specially Protected Areas.65
62
 UNEP Assessment “Oil pollution has been identified as an important environmental issue in the WCR 
and that due to the amount of oil tankers and frequency of navigation through out the region there is a big 
risk that accidents happen.  It is of paramount importance that flexible oil contingency plans be drafted to 
deal with emergencies not only for crude oil but other harmful substances that can also be transported in the 
region”, above n 49, 16. 
63
 UNEP Assessment above n 49, 11. Noted also by C. Roach, UNDP Caribbean Regional Seminar On The 
Use Of Information Technology In Comprehensive Disaster Management “The Transport Dimension: A 
Maritime Safety System” Ocho Rios, Jamaica 29 - 31 May 2002 slide 15
<http://www.cdera.org/pdfs/meetings/itconf2002/1_Disaster%20Preparedness%20Maritime%20Transport_
.pdf >  at 18 July 2003.
64
 The protocol on oil spills, the oldest of the three protocols, which among other things requires monitoring 
and reporting of oil spills, may be of questionable value.  In recent telephone interviews with officers of 
CEP’s offices in Kingston, Jamaica and the IMO’s representatives in Curacao, specifics of oil spills limited 
to the WCR for any period were not available.  Telephone interviews conducted June 25 and 26, 2003.  
Coincidentally,  Mr. Fion Molloy of ITOPF’s London office is preparing a study on spills in excess of 
5,000 tonnes in the Caribbean and has been kind enough to provide me with his statistics, which are 
attached as Appendix I.  Unfortunately, as ITOPF notes, its information is limited to tankers, combined 
carriers and barges, and only to accidental spills and that 85% of spills are less than 7 tonnes. Given such 
statistics and the limitations, one cannot but help to wonder what value such information really is in an 
analysis of oil entering the Caribbean as a result of shipping.  Furthermore, despite various estimates of 
amounts of oil entering the marine environment, such as those noted by S. Patin, "Environmental Impact of 
the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry"  <http://www.offshore-environment.com/oilpollution.html>   at June 
30, 2003 relying on three different studies, the GESAMP acknowledges that it needs to determine a number 
of variables before it can issue any authoritative numbers concerning oil entering the marine environment.  
IMO/FAO/UNESCO-IOC/WMO/WHO/IAEA/UN/UNEP, Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects 
of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP) “Report Of The Thirtieth Session” Monaco, 22–26 May 
2000, Reports and Studies No. 69, p. 5. http://gesamp.imo.org/no69/index.htm  at 5 July 2003 (hereinafter 
UNEP Monaco)
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Over one hundred protected areas have been established in the WCR.66  Unfortunately, 
many of the areas have no management plans.67  As noted in UNEP’s technical report on 
the issue: “Institutions involved with protected areas are usually small, understaffed, and 
under-trained.”68  Many of the parks created under SPAW are no more than “paper 
parks.”69
Article 11 requires the development of contingency plans.  This obligation was created in 
1983.  It has yet to occur.70  Other Article 11 obligations may be faring better.  One notes, 
for example, CEP’s report that it has provided information and coordination assistance in 
some marine pollution incidents.71
Article 12 requires international consultation with respect to major development projects.  
Despite major real estate developments pursuant to Mexico’s FONATUR72 and various 
major port developments,73 no evidence of such consultations having occurred was 
uncovered in the course of researching this paper.  
65
 The basis for this part of the discussion is M. Miller, “Protecting the Marine Environment of the Wider 
Caribbean Region: The Challenge of Institution-Building.” Green Globe Yearbook (1996) 37.
66
 Ibid, 41.
67
 Ibid.
68
 Caribbean Environment Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, CEP Technical Report 36  
“Status of Protected Area Systems in the Wider Caribbean Region” (1997) 3.
69 Miller, above n 60, 43.
70 Roach, above n 58.
71
 Noted on CEP website  http://www.cep.unep.org/search/map.html  at July 3, 2003.
72 Mexican government agency responsible for the development of major tourist destinations including 
Cancun, and Cozumel.
73
 A CSX container port being built on the Caucedo Peninsula, Dominican Republic is to be ready this year, 
2003 http://www.tdctrade.com/shippers/vol25_2/vol25_2_seaports02.htm  at 3 July 2003, another national 
port in Martinique for 2004, www.industriemartinique.com/industry.html and three more new ones reported  
in Panama http://www.embassy-avenue.jp/panama/econo.htm at 3 July 2003.
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Article 13 requires sharing of scientific information.  CEP’s series of 43 technical reports 
goes some way in addressing this concern.74  And a general review of internet search 
results indicates some cooperation among scientists and governments on environmental 
issues.75  Article 14 requires the development of laws to address liability and 
compensation in the event of pollution damage.  To date, this has not occurred.  In her 
analysis of Cartagena’s oil spills protocol, seven years ago Miller observed:  “Even in a 
non-controversial areas such as the oil-spills Protocol, progress on implementation has 
been slow… few of them [countries] have implementing legislation.”76
Article 15 requires institutional development and integration.  Such development and 
integration has not yet occurred to a significant extent.77  As Miller observed, “oil spills 
response capability in the region is still very limited, and it is inhibited by legal and 
administrative problems.”78
74
  Studies available on CEP’s website.  <http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/techreports/techreports.html> at 10 
July 2003.
75
 A search on google.com.mx under cooperacion entre cientificos sobre ambiente marino returned 4,810 
hits.  Clearly, not all of these will be exactly on topic but it does demonstrate some cooperation on the sigue 
of scientific cooperation on marine environmental matters.
76 Miller above n 60, 41.
77
 Miller above n 60, 41.  Note also the report of Timothy J. Kasten, Acting Deputy Coordinator, 
UNEP/Regional Coordinating Unit for the Caribbean Environment Programme, concerning the struggles of 
coordinating projects among parties dealing with CEP  http://www.gpa.unep.org/igr/Reports/WCR.htm  at 
15 July 2003.
78
 Ibid., p. 42.  Note that a number of private companies such as Spek of The Netherlands claim to have 
capabilities to have on the ground response worldwide in less that twenty four hours, so Miller’s criticism 
may not have that much force, unless it is specifically directed to the lack of oil response ships stationed or 
available within the area to respond.  As well, CEP’s Assessment and Management of Environmental 
Pollution newsletter of June 1999 states that a number of Caribbean oil companies have stockpiles of 
response equipment ready for rapid deployment. http://www.cep.unep.org/programmes/amep/update.html
at 12 July 2003.
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In the overall, as to the actual condition of the environment, there is little evidence that 
the situation today is different than it was twenty years ago when Cartagena was first 
ratified.
6.  WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
Given the complexity of the political and economic situations and of pollution itself, 
there are a number of causes which can be identified as causing or contributing to the 
problem.  The Global Action Plan meeting report identifies the following root causes: 
poverty, unsustainable consumption patterns, and poorly managed social and economic 
development.79
The region addressed by Cartagena would be characterized as having all four of the root 
causes: poverty, unsustainable consumption patterns, and poorly managed social and 
economic development.  Poverty, places a great number of competing demands on 
governments that themselves lack sufficient resources.  Governments of developing 
countries are dealing with such basic concerns as potable water, sanitary sewers, basic 
education, and housing.  Given these top priority items, it seems difficult to justify the 
expenditures required to address environmental concerns80 such as expensive port 
reception facilities81 or sewage treatment plants. 
79
 “Report Of The First Intergovernmental Review Meeting On The Implementation of The Global 
Programme Of Action For The Protection Of The Marine Environment From Land-Based Activities” 
Montreal, Canada, 26-30 November 2001 UNEP/GPA/IGR.1/9 (2001) 10.
80 CEP Technical Report 40 above n 52, 18.
81
 The costs of port reception facilities is one of the reasons given for their not being constructed in the 
WCR, Maritime Environment Committee of the IMO “The Lack Of Reception Facilities For Ship-
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Sewage as the main pollution concern in the WCR, deserves priority in terms of funding.   
Nevertheless, given the costs it is hardly surprising that sewage treatment is not 
improving.  As noted in UNEP’s 2001  report concerning the WCR: 
…serious and maybe expensive measures [to deal with sewage] should be taken 
promptly.  At present only very few governments are negotiating projects on 
sewage management.82
The generous figure is as previously mentioned, between 80% and 90% of all waste is 
discharged untreated into the near shore area of the Caribbean.83
This sewage treatment issue is exacerbated by the tourism industry.  Tourism is a very 
significant part of the economy of the WCR.84 On an annualized basis, these tourists add 
some 700,000 tons of solid waste.85  Furthermore, tourism is often developed in areas 
with insufficient municipal waste treatment facilities86  which situation is exacerbated by 
cruise ship dumping.
Generated Waste In Many Ports” MEPC/Circ.309, 19 January 1995, T5/1.07  http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-
m/nmc/imo/pdf/Circ0/Mepc1/309.pdf  at 2 July 2003.
82
 UNEP Assessment above n 49,  16. 
83
 UNEP Assessment above n 49, 11. SEE Lloyd Gardner, Ecotech Inc. Ltd, CEP Technical Report 38.  
“Coastal Tourism in the Wider Caribbean Region: Impacts and Best Management Practices”  (1997) 
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/techreports/tr38en/index.html  at 15 July 2003.
84
 It produced a very significant 25% of the GDP in 1996 it is expected to increase to 36% of the GDP by 
2006. (UNEP: Assessment of Land-based Sources and Activities Affecting the Marine, Coastal and 
Associated Freshwater Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region,” UNEP/GPA Co-ordination Office & 
Caribbean Environment Programme (1999), 8.) The region’s 70 million inhabitants are increased annually 
by some 35 million tourists with an average stay of 10 days. (This estimate does not include entire 
countries, such as Mexico or Columbia, whose entire population is not on the Caribbean. It does include the 
complete population of island countries.  Source: UNEP Assessment above n 49, 1.)   An additional 13.4 
million tourists arrive on cruise ships. UNEP Assessment above n 49, 4, The Caribbean hosts 50% of the 
world’s cruising tours  8.  This number is conservative given the radically different figures offered by GEO 
-3  “Tourism represents around 12 per cent of the GDP of the region, much of which is concentrated along 
the coasts. Some 100 million tourists visit the Caribbean each year and contribute 43 per cent of GDP and 
one third of export revenue.” Above n 53, 18.
85
 UNEP Assessment above n 49, 11. 
86 CEP Technical Report 33, above n 39, 7.
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Poverty further exacerbates the problem by limiting environmentally friendly alternatives 
for survival available to people suffering from poverty.  Many poor people sustain 
themselves by unsustainable consumption practices which result in such things as 
deforestation, and fishery collapses.87  Unsustainable consumption patterns are also 
manifest at the opposite end of the spectrum.  USA’s consumerist culture is universally 
recognized as very harmful to the environment.  The impact on the WCR of USA 
lifestyle can be seen in the level of contaminants in Mississippi River discharges into the 
Gulf of Mexico88 where in 1997 it created a 7,000 square mile dead zone in the Gulf of 
Mexico.89
Financing also effects governmental ability to treat pollution from oil extraction, refining 
and transport.  Financing problems inhibit a government’s ability to monitor oil 
contamination by ships in its waters and accordingly, the number of discharges 
discovered is minimal.  None of the Latin governments has appropriate funds for such 
monitoring.90  Further, governments lack funds for the notoriously expensive port 
reception facilities.  
87 Noted, for example, by Brown Weiss, “states do not agree on priorities—whether to satisfy immediate 
needs to alleviate poverty and local environmental degradation or longer-term needs to protect the 
robustness and integrity of the biosphere.” Op cit p. 710. And, as noted by Katz de Barrera-Hernandez and 
Lucas, “penalizing technically illegal activities undertaken for subsistence purposes, such as …. Wood-
cutting and hunting is highly unpopular and may have little practical effect where no realistic alternatives to 
these practices are available.”, p. 224.
88 CEP Technical Report. 40 above n 52, various.
89
 Carol Kaesuk Yoon, “A Dead Zone Grows in the Gulf of Mexico” Jan, 20, 19998 NY Times, at F1.
90
 Noted by Birnie and Boyle, above n 19.  The various agencies dealing with marine pollution note the 
lack of information, which may in part be a result of inadequate monitoring.  Surveillance “the shortage of 
information on marine environmental conditions and trends is a serious matter which, in the opinion of 
GESAMP outweighs in importance many of the issues currently being addressed by those responsible for 
marine environmental protection” 
On GESAMP Statement of 1998: Surveillance And Assessment Of  Marine Environmental Conditions  
http://gesamp.imo.org/surv_ass.htm  at 12 July 2003. As noted by UNEP “Oil and gas extraction, 
processing, storing and transporting have caused major pollution problems in the region.  There is however 
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Financing problems extend to the RSP administration itself, which as part of UNEP, has 
suffered from severe funding constraints.  RSP noted in its 2001 report: 
“The available biennial budget for the regional seas programmes had declined 
drastically from a level of some $10 million to $12 million during the first half of 
the 1990s, to a current level less than $3 million.”91
The WCR´s pollution problem also stems from failed efforts to manage economic 
development.  In particular, the need for foreign currency, brought in by industry, oil and 
tourism create an overwhelming pressure to relax or ignore competing environmental 
claims.92
Environmental law in Latin America is in considerable transition and reform.93
Currently, much environmental law is scattered through other pieces of legislation, and 
developed on outmoded command-and-control models.94  Legislative efforts have not 
been effectively coordinated and there are innumerable conflict of laws issues as new 
legislation is laid over top of existing legislation.95  These problems combine to leave 
many legislative gaps in terms of dealing with environmental problems.96
not much up-dated data on the status of oil pollution in the [WCR] region.” UNEP Assessment above n 49, 
13, exceptions noted for Havana Bay, the USA’s regions, Bluefields in Nicaragua and Puerto Limon in 
Costa Rica.
91
 UNEP Monaco above n 59, 6
92
 “In practice, priority has been given to the structural adjustment programs with a view to increase the 
generation of foreign currency… and to attend to the service of the external debt in the shortest period of 
time possible. The search for more international competitiveness, efficiency, and productivity has… [been] 
harmful for the environment.”  Noted in “Rio+5 Synthesis Report of Latin America Consultations,” San 
José, Costa Rica, (February 26, 1997) 2 
http://www.ncsdnetwork.org/americas/reports/rio5/regional/amlateng.htm  at 12 July 2003.
93
 L. Katz de Barrera-Hernandez and A. Lucas, “Environmental Law in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Overvew and Assessment,” 12 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. R., 207-245, p. 210. 
94
 Op cit.
95
 Op cit, p. 212.
96
 Op cit, 214.
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Finally, at an institutional level there are considerable problems.  The international 
corruption watchdog, Transparency International, places all of the Latin countries 
signatory to Cartagena among the bottom 50% corrupt countries.97  This failure, when 
combined with the complex nature of the political situation—the WCR is made up of 36 
states and territories with widely varying economies, levels of development, populations, 
and access to resources—exacerbates the problems of coordination. The governments 
themselves are weak and poorly organized.98  Finally, many writers and reports note the 
lack of political will to deal with the issues.99
7.  MEXICO: A COUNTRY SPECIFIC CASE STUDY OF THE 
CARTAGENA CONVENTION
In many ways Mexico is typical of Latin American countries, including most of the 
countries that have ratified Cartagena and may be therefore a good indicator of how 
things transpire in the other countries that have ratified Cartagena.  Mexico is the second 
97
 Beginning with Colombia and Mexico tied at 57th of 102 with a score of 3.7 and 3.6 out of 10 
respectively, all the other Latin countries receive lower rankings.  The notable exception is Costa Rica 
which scored 4.5 .  The Netherlands, UK, USA, France received scores 9.0, 8.7, 7.7, 6.3 respectively and 
the non-Latin countries, Trinidad & Tobago, and Jamaica, received 4.9 and 4.0—still not a very respectable 
score.  Transparency International, “Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2002,” Table 
2, http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.en.html  at 12 July 2003.
98 As noted in GEO-3 on the Latin American region: Noted in GEO – 3  “institutional and organizational 
weaknesses in the countries of the region, and the myriad authorities responsible for marine and coastal 
management, make the implementation of policies a difficult task.” Above n 53, 18.  Further, these 
governments with limited resources (noted in UNEP Nov. 2001, 18), are more susceptible to what Weiss 
Brown refers to as “treaty congestion.” Weiss Brown 697-702.
99 For example, GESAMP Reports and Studies No. 66, Annex X GESAMP Statement Of 1998 Concerning 
Marine Pollution Problems http://gesamp.imo.org/ocean.htm  at 21 July 2003, UNEP, G. Palmer,  “New 
Ways to Make International Environmental Law” (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. 273, and Peet, above n 21, 51.   See 
also UNEP Monaco above n 59, 6, GEO-3, above n 53, 19, Palmer above n 89.
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largest economy in Latin America.  Its population is approaching 100 million inhabitants 
and it depends heavily on oil production and tourism for its economic strength.  The 
majority of both its oil and its tourism are located on and in the Caribbean.
Mexican environmental laws are reasonably stringent and comprehensive.100  Article 27 
of the 1917 Constitution states that public interests must be considered in the exploitation 
of natural resources.  Environmental issues were not a serous consideration, however, 
until Mexico began to industrialize in the 1950–60’s.101  In the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s the Mexican government changed its view of natural resources in general, and the 
environment in particular, from a public good in need of protection to an economic 
resource.  The result has been that environmental law is now created and subjected to a 
cost-benefit analysis.102
Mexico has gone through turbulent economic times since 1973.103  There have been three 
currency devaluations since that time, the last in 1994.104  Real average earnings declined 
20% in the four years following the last devaluation.105 Given this difficult situation, it 
can hardly be questioned but that “Mexico’s thirst for economic stability has led to the 
relaxation of environmental enforcement.”106  In addition to such activities as dumping 
100
 S. Walker, “General Overview of Mexican Environmental Law” 1997,  Southwest Texas State 
University, San Marcos, Texas http://www.mtnforum.org/resources/library/walks97b.htm  at 25 July 2003.
101
 G. Gonzalez and M. Gastelum, National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade “Overview of the 
Environmental Laws of Mexico” (1999)  http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/spmxen13.htm  at 2 July 2003, sec. 
1A no page numbers.
102
 Walker, op cit, p. 6
103
 J. Warnock, The Other Mexico: The North American Triangle Complete (1995) 40.
104
 1976, 1982, and 1994.
105
 J. Dames, “Note: An Examination of Mexico and the Unreasonable Goals of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development” (1998) 10 Fordham Envtl LJ 78
106
 Dames, ibid 79, see also, Warnock, ibid, 210-229.
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untreated toxic wastes directly into the Rio Grande,107 the river which marks Mexico’s 
northern border with the United States and which empties into the Gulf of Mexico, 108
Mexico has courted foreign investment on the basis of relaxed environmental 
enforcement.109
Mexico is a signatory to MARPOL 73/78, Annexes I and II, and to Cartagena.   As a civil 
law jurisdiction, these ratifications require no further legislation to become law.  The 
implementing legislation for these agreements, however, is not present.110  An effective 
bureaucracy to administer the responsibilities has not been created.  The efficacy of the 
legal system is undermined by the internecine fighting between various governments and 
a corrupt judiciary.111  Finally, Mexican law enforcement is less than consistent or 
transparent, to say the least.112
After its conspiratorial view in the 1970’s that environmentalists were sponsored by 
multinationals opposed to the development of poor nation, the government began to 
develop a small bureaucracy to deal with the environment.  The Mexican government 
107
 For example, biologist, Jorge Barroso, noted 14 companies located in the Industrial Park Mesa de Otay 
which were dumping directly into 
108
 Known in Latin America as the Rio Bravo.
109
 Noted, for example, in R. Cata, “Emerging Markets Liability in Latin America”, 27 U. Miami, Inter.-
Am. L.R. 509, at p. 536, who observes Mexico’s announcement of relaxing standards for environmental 
impact studies, (apparently in response to the peso devaluation in the previous year) and in general, Joel 
Simon, Mexcio en Riesgo, (1998) Mexico, Editorial Diana, pp. 223-257.
110
 Although the Mexican federal environmental website acknowledges its commitments under UNCLOS 
and MARPOL, curiously it does not refer to Cartagena. “About Us” 
<http://www.profepa.gob.mx/seccion.asp?sec_id=169&com_id=0> at July 21, 2003.
111
 Discussed generally in United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention “Judicial 
Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Consequences,” March 2001, Vienna, CICP 14, 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp14.pdf
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 Noted in Simon, op cit, n. 105, p. 261.  Cata observes “Although most Latin American Countries have 
already enacted environmental legislation, not all enforce these laws with the same zeal.”, op cit n., 101, p. 
533.
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first acknowledged the seriousness of the situation when President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-
2000) appointed biologist, Julia Carabias, as chief of the Secretariat of Environment, 
Natural Resources and Fisheries (SEMARNAP). Carabias observed: “we (inhabitants of 
Mexico) have reached a critical point in terms of environmental degradation.”113 The 
Mexican environmental agency states that the condition of the environment in Mexico is 
no less than “apocalyptic.”114 The United Nations, for example, has declared the 
mountainous regions of the State of Oaxaca the most eroded location on the planet.115
Exacerbating the seriousness of the situation is that this area is among the top 15 most 
important areas on the planet in terms of biodiversity.116
More specifically, despite Mexico’s reliance on the marine environment, it has not been 
able to protect it.117  Cancun, for example, an internationally renowned tourist 
destination, is Mexico’s jewel on the Caribbean.  It borders on the second largest coral 
reef in the world, second only to Australia’s Great Barrier Reef.118  Cancun was 
developed as an unpolluted, non-third world alternative to Mexico’s previously favoured 
113
 Interview quoted in Simon, op cit, n 101 p. 260.  Translation certified by the author. 
114 Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente (PROFEPA) writes: “The challenge faced in the 
enforcement of the law is enormous.  While advances were achieved by prior administrations, the results 
were not always favorable.  In some cases, the results were adverse.  For this reason, it is important that we 
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Us” <http://www.profepa.gob.mx/seccion.asp?sec_id=169&com_id=0> at July 21, 2003  For a map of the 
erosion problem, see that prepared by Programa Para el Control de la Erosion y Restauracion de los  Suelos 
de Oaxaca at  http://www.laneta.apc.org/pcers/erosion.html  at August 30, 2003.
115 Simon, op cit, p. 37.  More than 80% of the state suffers from erosion and the level of erosion in one 
third of the state is in grave condition.  For a map of the erosion problem, see that prepared by Programa 
Para el Control de la Erosion y Restauracion de los  Suelos de Oaxaca at  
http://www.laneta.apc.org/pcers/erosion.html  at August 30, 2003.  This aspect of Mexico’s environmental 
situation is reflected elsewhere in Latin America.  For example, in El Salvador, only 6% of its original 
forests are still in extistence  and 90% of its rivers are contaminated.  Holley, p. 94. 
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 Mexico’s Report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, First National 
Communication For The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change, (2000) p. 25 at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/mexnc1e.pdf , at August 30, 2003.
117
 For a general discussion about the state of the environment in Mexico, see, Simon, op cit, n. 99. 
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destinations of Acapulco, Puerto Vallarta and Mazatlan.  The Mexican government has
invested USD $3 billion in the development of Cancun since it started in 1969.  Private 
investors have invested an equal amount.119  Cancun has over 20,000 hotel rooms, 
receives more than 1.5 million tourists annually, and accounts for one third of Mexico’s
USD $6.35 billion tourist income.120  Cancun provides 2.7 million jobs or 9% of the 
active workforce.121
Today, Cancun’s lagoon smells of human wastes and its sewage flows untreated into the 
Caribbean polluting beaches to the north as far as Puerto Juarez122 and killing the reefs 
on which part of its tourist appeal relies.123  These environmental problems are starting to 
drive tourists away from Cancun and further south along the Caribbean coast.124  The 
writers of the UN WCMC Atlas describe Mexico’s Caribbean situation as follows: 
Small reef patches, such as El Garrafon at Isla Mujeres and Punta Nizuc at 
Cancun, have been completely destroyed by tourism and impacts are becoming 
more evident elsewhere along the Cancun-Tulum touristic [sic] corridor, in places 
such as Akumal and Puerto Morelos, as well as the offshore island of Cozumel.125
If this is occurring in the most important Caribbean location, within the jurisdiction of the 
region’s second wealthiest Latin nation, it seems highly unlikely that much more is being 
done to protect the marine environment by neighbouring, poorer states.  
118
 Simon, op cit, p. 214.
119
 Op cit, p. 212.
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As one of the WCR’s major oil producers, Mexico should have considerable facilities to 
deal with oil pollution.126  In addition, Mexico is home to a number of major cruise ship 
destinations.  Yet none of its major WCR ports have adequate reception facilities.  
Mexico also fails in its aerial surveillance of the WCR.  
Finally, given Mexico’s weak and corrupt policing and judicial systems, it can hardly be 
said that there is any meaningful enforcement of marine environmental law by Mexico.  
Mexican environmental inspectors earn about $150 USD per month and it is known that 
bribery is routine.127  Indeed, the Mexican government under the Fox administration has 
recognized the problem of corruption among its environmental inspectors and has 
developed specific strategies to address it;128 however, to date little has changed.
Mexico’s failure to successfully implement many aspects of Cartagena do not speak well 
of the situation elsewhere in the WCR.129
126
 Oil spills are first the responsibility of the Navy, then PEMEX, the state-owned oil monopoly in Mexico.  
ITOPF’s country profile of Mexico identifies PEMEX as has considerable facilities; however, the ability of 
PEMEX to respond, again because of in-fighting among its corrupt officials makes it questionable.  
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8.  CONCLUSION
There are a number of conclusions which can be drawn from this brief study.  First and 
foremost, the current system of environmental protection is failing to protect adequately 
the environment of the WCR.  Countries need to address the issues blocking 
implementation.  Clearly, one important aspect will be finding some means of improving 
political will, perhaps by a different incentive scheme.130  This problem is something that 
must be addressed by the developing countries.  
As well, a major reason for failure to protect the environment of the WCR from its two 
most serious pollution threats, sewage and oil, is the lack of finances.131  The third 
world’s problem with lack of finances was acknowledged and addressed at Rio.  Agenda 
21 of the Rio Convention committed the developed countries to contribute 0.7% of the 
GNP to developing countries for sustainable development and Agenda 21 
implementation.  Unfortunately, the developed countries, with few exceptions,132  have 
not followed through.133  And even if they had, the perception among poorer countries is 
130
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39
that the 0.7% figure hardly demonstrates a serious commitment to environmental 
protection.134
Given the USA´s position as the world’s largest economy and largest polluter, it has a 
moral obligation to assist in financing pollution reduction and control activities. Its 
current position as the lowest contributor of aid among developed nations is morally 
reprehensible.  The recent administrations have failed to step up to the challenge of being 
world leaders in this most significant sense.
Further as, Michael Julian, chair of the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection 
Committee, observes, users—and in particular oil companies which have the greatest 
need for such facilities—should be paying should be paying for port reception 
facilities.135 The current environmental degradation resulting from responsibility for 
these costs being placed with impoverished Caribbean governments is inevitable if the 
financing situation remains as it is. A disproportionate amount of environmental damage 
is being done in poor countries to meet rich countries demand for cheap oil. 136
The problem of environmental degradation is not limited to the WCR.  Nor has the 
current international environmental legal regime succeeded to any significant extent in 
practical and realize that the USA is never going to contribute the 0.7%, regardless of its commitments 
(Cited in Dames, above n 94, 91 -2).  In other words, the USA wishes to continue to exploit the WCR for its 
oil and tourism needs while avoiding paying the full costs of those activities.
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stopping or reversing environmental degradation.137  It may be that as various authors 
have proposed that a whole new approach to environmental law making is needed.  These 
scholars suggest an international legal regime, such as an empowered WTO equivalent 
which ignores sovereignty, create and enforce environmental legislation.138  This 
interesting suggestion has yet to be taken very far.
Other suggestions could include negotiating treaties which address the financial issue and 
the lack of political will at the outset by committing signatories specify and allocate  a 
percentage of GDP as a mandatory contribution for monitoring and enforcement.  The 
legislation would take effect the year after the current incumbent government’s term 
expires.  Such a term could be reviewable and alterable upon a five year period and a 
majority basis.  The lack of start up funds and the weakening commitment to programs 
over the long term may be addressed by such a mechanism. 
Another important modification to environmental treaties would be to grant standing to 
interested parties in the jurisdiction of their choice.  For example, given the conflicting 
interests governments find themselves in with respect to economy versus environment, 
granting standing to environmental groups to bring enforcement litigation in the courts of 
their choice would certainly increase the power of such treaties.  Individuals with such 
137
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interests are much more likely to monitor and take enforcement measures when they are 
given the power to litigate.
Finally, for effective enforcement, technical standards and specifications must be set and 
published early on in the process.  While the argument is made that treaties get bogged 
down and die in the process of negotiating the details, non-contentious, minimal 
standards could be set, again on a renegotiable basis on a five year time frame.  Such an 
approach would at least start the process.  Information about potentially harmful activities 
and proposed activities must be widely disbursed as soon as possible.  This distribution of 
information is critical if NGO’s are to be involved in the monitoring and enforcement 
aspects.  The current lack of standards and publication makes it difficult to know who is 
doing what to the environment.  The lack of enforcement permits polluters impunity. 
Cartagena has not been the shining success it could have been.  No country has fully 
lived up to its environmental responsibilities.  That strategy appears to be strategy of 
most nations, which can only result in the tragedy of the commons warned about nearly 
forty years ago.139
139 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science, 162(1968):1243-1248.
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APPENDIX I  -  MAJOR TANKER SPILLS OF OVER 5,000 TONNES 
IN THE CARIBBEAN SINCE 1974
Quantity spilledVessel Name
(tonnes) (Type)
Country Yea
r
Cause
ATLANTIC EMPRESS 287,000 CRUDE LESSER 
ANTILLES
1979 COLLISION
EPIC 
COLOCOTRONIS
60,000 CRUDE LESSER 
ANTILLES
1975 FIRE/EXPLOSI
ON
BURMAH AGATE 36,000 CRUDE USA 1979 COLLISION
SCORPIO 32,000 CRUDE MEXICO 1976 GROUNDING
CYS DIGNITY 16,000 CRUDE VENEZUELA 1979 GROUNDING
LSCO PETROCHEM 16,000 FUEL OIL 
(cargo)
USA 1976 GROUNDING
AEGEAN CAPTAIN 14,000 CRUDE LESSER 
ANTILLES
1979 COLLISION
OSWEGO TARMAC 11,000 BITUMEN LESSER 
ANTILLES
1977 COLLISION
ALVENUS 8,500 CRUDE USA 1984 GROUNDING
PRINCESS ANNE 
MARIE
6,500 CRUDE CUBA 1980 GROUNDING
MASTER MICHAEL 6,000 FUEL OIL 
(cargo)
Caribbean Sea 1979
MEGA BORG 5,700 CRUDE USA 1990 FIRE/EXPLOSI
ON
ARKAS 5,000 CRUDE USA 1982 COLLISION
